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**INCORPORATION OF UKRAINIAN CHURCH
(KYIV METROPOLITANATE) RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL PROJECT ON
2 ACTIONS (1ST ACTION)**

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Анотация

Николай Василиевич Шкрибляк. Инкорпорация на украинската църква (Киевската митрополия): религиозно-политически проект в две действия (действие първо). В статията е осъществен историософски анализ на общественно-политическите и църковно-

религиозните трансформации от втората половина XVII в., станали върху земите, които сега образуват едината Украинска държава, показана е спецификата на реализацията на религиозно-политическия проект на московското правителство, насочен към присъединяване на украинската Църква (Киевската митрополия) в състава на Московската патриаршия през 1686 г. и е изтолкуван целия комплекс от средства на политическо и църковно-административно въздействие от страна на Московията от Переяславското съглашение от 1654 г. до избирането на хетмана И. Самойлович .

Ключови думи: Украинска Църква, Киевска митрополия, Константинополска патриаршия, Московска патриаршия, инкорпорация, събор, църковни канони, апостолски правила, постановления на съборите.

Анотація

Микола Васильович Шкрібляк **Інкорпорація української церкви (Київської митрополії): релігійно-політичний проект на дві дії (дія перша).** У статті здійснено історіософський аналіз суспільно-політичних і церковно-релігійних трансформацій другої половини XVII ст., що відбувалися на землях, які нині утворюють єдину Українську державу, унаочнено специфіку реалізації релігійно-політичного проекту московського уряду, спрямованого на приєднання Української Церкви (Київської митрополії) до складу Московської патріархії 1686 р. та витлумачено увесь комплекс засобів політичного і церковно-адміністративного впливу з боку Московії від Переяславської угоди 1654 р. до обрання гетьманом І.Самойловича.

Ключові слова: Українська Церква, Київська митрополия, Константинопольська патріархія, Московська патріархія, інкорпорація, собор, церковні канони, апостольські правила, постанови соборів.

Аннотация

Николай Васильевич Шкрібляк **Инкорпорация украинской церкви (Киевской митрополии): религиозно-политический проект на два действия (действие первое).** В статье осуществлено историософский анализ общественно-политических и церковно-религиозных трансформаций второй половины XVII в., происходивших на землях, которые сейчас образуют единое Украинское государство, показано специфику реализации религиозно-политического проекта московского правительства, направленного на присоединение украинской Церкви (Киевской митрополии) в состав Московской патриархии 1686 г. и истолковано весь комплекс средств политического и церковно-административного воздействия со стороны Московии от Переяславского соглашения 1654 г. до избрания гетьманом И. Самойловича .

Ключевые слова: Украинская Церковь, Киевская митрополия, Константинопольская патриархия, Московская патриархия, инкорпорация, собор, церковные каноны, апостольские правила, постановления соборов.

The main content of the article. As soon as the Pereyaslav pact

was signed in 1654 Moscow aimed at the incorporation of Kyiv Church into the Moscow patriarchate. Having started the realization of personal church expansive plans, Moscow tsarism faced unexpected and quite appreciable resistance from Ukrainian ministry. Silverster (Kosiv), Metropolitan of Kyiv, Halych and the whole Rus was decisively against the political union as far back as Pereyaslav pact. The Ukrainian archbishop seemed to realize that the loss of state independence will involve the loss of church autonomy and will make way for Moscow to russify and assimilate Ukrainian congregation. Even such a humble and entirely allegianceant person as Silverster Kosiv, the metropolitan of Kyiv, at once started to show his unfriendliness toward Moscow; didn't recognize Moscow voyevoda in Kyiv, didn't want to permit his people to make fealty to Moscow tsar, didn't let Muscovites to build on the land appertained by the church. It meant that even though the ministry didn't know the goals of Khmelnytsky's game, they could see clearly its consequences [18, p. 55]. the chain of some other facts proves the fact that the ministry didn't share the political intrigue of hetman B. Khmelnytsky. For instance, on January 16th 1654, when Moscow envoy, boyar Andriy Buturlin was to arrive to Kyiv, metropolitan Silverster, in (for) spite to Moscow government and hetman Khmelnytsky's plan, organized and personally carried out a solemn rogation in St. Sophia's Cathedral. When the divine service was over, tsar's emissary asked the metropolitan reproachfully: "Why at the time hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and all Zaporozhian Cossacks bowed before the great sovereign many times asking to take them in his ward, you never did this, didn't write and searched for tsar's favor?" [Quote from : 6, p.216]. The reply was too brave and unequivocal: "It's better to die than give ourselves up to strangers" – said the head of Ukrainian church. The metropolitan opposed the political plans of hetman B.Khmelnytsky and Moscow tsarism and flatly refused to put on oath to outlandish sovereign his ecclesiastics – clergymen, deacons, monks, nobility, servants and other nobility. Silverster Kosiv affirmed that "they are free people and that's why he won't make anybody to swear to tsar" [6, p.16]. However, the history will show that he lacked strength and support to resist Khmelnytsky's inviolate pressure. The metropolitan was forced to cede and soon he died (April 1657).

Many historians consider that B. Khmelnytsky conformed to the incorporation of Kyiv Metropolitanate starting from the first negotiations with Moscow. The proof is B. Khmelnytsky's letters to Moscow patriarch Nykon where hetman, before the Pereyaslav pact was signed, calls him "a supremer archpastor". To our mind such statements contain vivid ideological and political covert sense. First of all treaty clauses signed in spring 1654 don't contain any statement concerning incorporation (or any possible incorporation in prospective) of Ukrainian Church into the Moscow patriarchate. Right after the death of hetman, Moscow government declared the possible existence of these clauses. And secondly, if Khmelnytsky really had desired to change canon law of Kyiv Metropolitanate, he would have used Silverster Kosiv's death and asked the Moscow patriarch to constitute a new metropolitan of Kyiv. But he did everything in a different way: without informing Moscow about the

free metropolitan appointment, he personally appoints Chernihiv bishop Lazarus Baranovych as a locum tenens and announces the date of council convocation to elect new metropolitan. Council was to be held on August 15th, 1657 [16, p.201]. However hetman didn't make to see its decisions, B. Khmelnytsky died on July 27th.

Immediately after his death Moscow voyevodas start settling clerical question. They sent ambassadors to hetman Ivan Vyhovsky and higher ecclesiastical guidance lest they should dare to elect a new metropolitan without approval from Moscow. The most active in this matter showed Kyiv boyar-voyevoda Andriy Buturlin. He personally attained locum tenens of Kyiv Metropolitanate Lazarus and Pechersk archimandrite Inokentiy (Hizel) that they and their subjects "search for favour and go over obedience and blessing of the great sovereign Holiness Nikon, the patriarch of Moscow, all Great and Small and White Russia". Buturlin also attained so that without tsar's decree "no bishop should be sent for and metropolitan should not be elected without the blessing of the great sovereign and patriarch" [11, p. 370]. Not willing to aggravate the situation, bishop Lazarus Baranovych declared that everything will be decided after Bohdan Khmelnytsky burial [11, p. 373].

The date of council was drawing near and that's why the intrigues became only stronger. A. Buturlin with his henchmen nominated locum tenens Lazarus Baranovych for a new metropolitan, as he promised to go over obedience and spiritual guardianship of Moscow patriarch in case of his election [1, p.8]. The confirmation of his intentions was the fact, that before elections he agreed to resubordinate Chernihiv eparchy headed by him. However, parties to council dwelled upon three other nominees: bishop of Lutsk, Dionisius Balaban, archimandrite of Volyn, Joseph Nelyubovych-Tukalsky and bishop of Lviv, Arsenii Zheliborskiy [1, p.19]. According to the results one of the candidates obtained necessary quantity of votes and it was decided to postpone the elections "to Mykola autumn day" [1, p.25]. It seemed to be a futile delay of time, useful only for the ideological inspirers of tsar religious and political intrigues. On December 19th, 1657 bishop Dionisius (Balaban) hetman Ivan Vyhovsky's nominee was elected Metropolitan of Kyiv, Halych and the whole Rus having ignored bishop of Chernihiv, Lazarus Baranovych as a candidate.

Failure of Moscow adherents in Kyiv metropolitan electoral campaign incited tsar government to more radical actions. At first its representatives endeavoured to persuade I. Vyhovsky to recede sending metropolitan Dionisius to Constantinople for confirmation [11, p. 373-374]. Dionisius Balaban didn't go to Constantinople after all, but it doesn't mean that hetman conceded to the desire of Moscow. Rather vice versa. Because, when I. Vyhovsky finally broke off relations with Moscow and start negotiations with Warsaw, the metropolitan moved to him in Chyhyryn and never returned to Kyiv [5, p. 244]. So, the events were not in favor of Moscow. The Ukrainian party showed a complete defiance by means of its ecclesiastical and religious initiative and, moreover, shifted the residence of Kyiv metropolitan to the territory controlled by the hostile country. Despite this fact, Moscow government didn't despair to win over hetman Vyhovsky [7, 171-172; Compare: 12, p. 545]. However, on convincing

themselves in hetman's firmness, Moscow counted on Yurii Khmelnytsky. On October 27th, 1659 in Pereyaslav on prince A. Trubetsky's demand Yurii was elected the hetman of Left-bank Ukraine.

Ukrainian sergeant majors, confused with the quick course of events and destabilization of political situation, in which they participated [15, p.454], proved to be unable to take a sober view of situation and consolidate their efforts towards struggle against foreign ascendancy. Political uncertainty in Cossack sergeant majors environment and sometimes even connivance in the Moscow's religious and political plans let A. Trubovetsky at Pereyaslav General Council carry out 2 olographs that contained fourteen paragraphs generally destructive in its nature for Ukraine. The 8th paragraph assigned the legal status of Ukrainian Church. It was stressed particularly in this paragraph that "the Kyiv metropolitan and other Ruthenia ecclesiastics went over blessing of the saint patriarch of Moscow, all Great and Small and White Russia and he won't interfere with church rights" [1, p.264]. Metropolitan Ilarion (Ohienko) proves the existence of alternative variant of this paragraph that was delivered ex parte Y. Khmelnytsky by colonel Petro Doroshenko. According to the 8th paragraph Ukrainian Church was to stay further as part of Constantinople patriarchy [7, p.172]. Nevertheless, sergeant majors didn't support it.

Ukrainian archbishops didn't object either, as none of the Kyiv Metropolitanate archiereus was present there. In fact Kyiv Metropolitanate was presented (not clear from whose benediction) by the archimandrite of Kobryn monastery, Job Zayonchkovsky (was sent to Pereyaslav to swear in a newly-elected hetman), archpriest of Pereyaslav Hruhoriy Butovich and some hieromonk from Pechersk. Archpriest Maksym Fylymonovych, henchman of Moscow patriarch headed this so-called church delegation [1, p. 272-273]. Owing to his support, article concerning the supremacy of Moscow patriarchy over Kyiv Metropolitanate became canonical, thus obligatory to be fulfilled. For this favor he was recompensed with generous gifts: sables for the amount of 500 rubles and 500 gold chervonets.

Having adopted beneficial for Moscow tsarism articles, Russian government and Moscow patriarch appointed the bishop of Chernihiv, Lazarus as a locum tenens of Kyiv Metropolitanate (this position at the order of B. Khmelnytsky archbishop already occupied after the death of metropolitan Silvester). Lazarus Baranovych appointment now the adherent of the idea of Moscow supremacy took place in October 1659, at the time when Dionisius was a metropolitan. This event had negative consequences: at first it lead to opposition and then resulted in the division of church hierarchies.

Having come to their senses, Cossack sergeant majors in December of the current year sent delegation on business to Moscow with intercession to repeal the 8th paragraph, claiming that "we, lay people, shouldn't speak about subordination to patriarch, and it will be enough to follow the commands of Constantinople patriarch" [17, p. 176-177; also: 4, p. 309]. It was clear that plan for incorporation of Ukrainian Church once again failed to find support: neither locum tenens Lazarus Baranovych, nor the clergy of Left-bank Ukraine didn't try to break off relations with Constantinople. The proof is the position of Ukrainian hierarchs invited

to the Great Moscow council 1666–1667, where the bishop of Chernihiv Lazarus was also present. Eastern patriarchs Païsiy of Alexandria and Makariy of Antioch ordered before the beginning of solemn divine service in Moscow Cathedral of the Dormition so that none of the Russian and Ukrainian archiereus had a crosses on their mitres. The representatives of Ukrainian Church replied that hierarchs of Kyiv Metropolitanate have an exceptional privilege to have cross on mitre, granted by the Constantinople patriarch [10, p.370]. So Ukrainian archbishops demonstrated that they have right to decide on their own how to act. The aggressive behavior of Cossacks aroused warning of the council hosts from Moscow. They clearly showed that despite the Lazarus Baranovych's appointment a locum tenens, Dionisius still stays for them the Kyiv metropolitan [7, p.177-178].

On convincing the firm position of Kyiv Metropolitanate clergy, tsar government decides to use their old and effective method: they count on ordinary believers, appeal to lower social strata. Moscow agents with greater enthusiasm began persuading them in necessity of "exposing Ukrainian to tsar's administration" [10, p.190]. Discontented with Cossack sergeant majors and archbishop's oppression, anxious for hetman policy aimed at rapprochement with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, peasantry and petty clergy responded to tsar's promises and vastly supported his actions.

The leading role in religious and expansionist propaganda of Moscow kept playing Maksym Fylymonovych. With his help Moscow government and pro-Russian hetman Ivan Bryuhovetsky [15, p.481-482] planned to carry out the incorporation of Ukrainian Church. Fylymonovych was called out to Moscow. There on May 4th, 1661 patriarch deputy, metropolitan Pitirim ordained him to a bishop of Mstyslav and Orsany (Name day - Methodius). The contemporary Russian historian A. Kartashev writes that Maksym Fylymonovych was consecrate to a bishop only because "seemed to be obedient and reliable to Moscow". For this obedience the latter generously rewarded him with money and "sable fur" [9, p.682].

Illegitimacy of bargain (Fylymonovych's consecration to a bishop and his appointment as a locum tenens of Kyiv Metropolitanate) was obvious. Eparchy of Mstyslav was located on canonical territory of Kyiv Metropolitanate therefore only its head can consecrate to a bishop. Consequently neither clergy, nor Cossacks sergeant majors recognized archpriest Maksym a bishop, moreover a locum tenens. Kyiv metropolitan Dionisius himself reacted adequately on non-canonical consecration of Fylymonovych. The metropolitan anathematized him and consecrated Joseph Tukalsky, the archimandrite of Lishchyn (Viden) to a bishop of Mstyslav. The patriarch of Constantinople following Dionisius Balaban's example anathematized Fylymonovych because he get a high ecclesiastical post thanks to secular and by far foreign government. His act should be treated as a complete recognition of metropolitan Dionisius' ecclesiastical power in Kyiv Metropolitanate and a flat discord to Moscow intervention into its business. Here is what A. Kartashev wrote about this situation: "However neither Greeks nor some part of Southern bishops didn't accept this "impudent" Moscow claim to annex a complete Kyiv church. Never mind Dionisius (Boloban) the patriarch of Constantinople proclaimed

prohibition for Methodius to carry out a divine service. Moscow intercession to Constantinople had no success" [9, p.682].

On May 10th, 1663 earnest protector of Ukrainian Church, metropolitan Dionisius died. The necessity in another council became imminent. It was to be held in Korsun on December 9th – 10th of the current year. Besides new metropolitan election, members were to discuss the question of reaching a consensus between Orthodox clergy that was vital taking into account the deployment condition of civil war in Cossacks surroundings. Joseph Nelyubovych-Nukalsky, the bishop of Mstyslav and Anthony Vynnycky, the bishop of Peremis bid for the post of Kyiv metropolitan. None of them received the appropriate number of voices though the odds were in Joseph's favour. However, Joseph Tykalsky's power as a metropolitan, agreed to recognize only Right-bank Ukraine representatives (frankly speaking, Left-bank Ukraine representative simple were not present, as this territory was under Warsaw protectorate) [15, p.469]. Polish king Jan II Kazymyr confirmed in his decree both nominees as a metropolitan. In fact Joseph's Tukalsky's authority spread only on Right-bank Ukraine with Chyhyryn as a residence, and Anthony Vynnycky was a metropolitan on the territory of Halychyna, Volun and partly Podillya (metropolitan's residence was in Kamyanets-Podilsky and he had a status – exarch of Constantinople patriarch).

The appearance of two spiritual centers of one Church assist the consolidation of Ukrainian society. Once unified Kyiv Metropolitanate divided into two parts, each with its own two independent Orthodox jurisdiction. It resulted in the division of Orthodox clergy and laity. On being confused in this situation, one recognized Joseph Tukalsky the metropolitan, the others – Anthony Vynnycky. There was only one good thing about it, both metropolitans were subordinate to the patriarch of Constantinople and didn't intend to change anything in prospect.

At the same time, the fact that Y. Khmelnytsky abdicated his hetman post essentially destabilized ecclesiastical and religious life. In 1663 at Chorna rada owing to the help of Moscow government, Ivan Brukhovetsky called "strange in his speeches" (previously commander of Cossack camp) was elected as a new hetman [15, p.471]. Having used the opportunity, Moscow government began to "promote" to the Kyiv metropolitan once again a lowbrow archpriest Maksym (Methodius) Fylymonovych. For this reason Moscow even persuaded the patriarch of Constantinople to remove an anathema from him. So as we can see, in Ukraine power (both state and ecclesiastic) at last lapsed to the hands of Moscow tsar's henchmen.

However the situation was not in favor of Moscow. Moscow patriarchy found itself in a deplorable condition: inner ecclesiastic crisis, metropolitan Pitirim's struggle for spheres of influence, scandal over "rebellious" patriarch Nikon (Izvekov), preparations for the Moscow council 1666 – 1667. All this factors made the patriarchy once again deaden for some time its religious and chauvinistic instincts.

At that time Petro Doroshenko strengthen himself as an autocratic hetman of the Right-bank Ukraine, who oriented himself in foreign policy at the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and Turkey. He even managed to captivate I. Bryuhovetsky with this idea. P. Doroshenko proclaimed

Joseph Nelyubovych–Tukalsky the lawful metropolitan of Kyiv, Halych and the whole Rus. Lazarus Baranovych, his clergy and believers of Left-bank Ukraine rose against it. In summer 1668 hetman Bryuhovetsky was ferociously killed by his own homagers, and metropolitan Joseph Tukalsky sent obtruded by Moscow Methodius Fylymonovych to Uman monastery, having deprived him of panagia and mantle. “You don’t deserve to be a bishop – metropolitan declared – because you were consecrated by the Moscow patriarch”. Priests and deacons consecrated by the bishop Methodius, he anathematized and obliged to visit him for reconsecration [7, p.179].

It seemed Muscovite Fylymonovych didn’t intend to repent and reconcile with cloistral fraternity and decided to run away to Moscow where he was treated according to inherent to Russian manner: he was sent to monastery prison where soon died [9, p. 683].

The Ukrainian clergy’s stand, especially metropolitan and higher hierarchy’s to a great extent had effect on the development of political events. As a result metropolitan’s post was the object of constant attention of different governments. While the metropolitan was still alive, locum tenens and administrators of Kyiv Metropolitanate were appointed and in 1663 his post was at the same time occupied by two metropolitans, administrator and a locum tenens. All the parties in Ukraine had their own nominee and henchman for metropolitan’s post: Poland – Anthony Vinnycky, Joseph Shumlyansky, Arseniy Geliborsky; Russia – Lazarus Baranovych, Methodius Fylymonovych, and a bit later also Hedeon Svyalopolk-Chetverynsky; Turkey – the bishop of Kamyanets, Pankratius. Hetman P. Doroshenko relied on metropolitan Joseph Helyubovych-Tukalsy who was liberated in 1667 from Marbork Castle [5, p. 417]. Due to the suggestion of boyard A. Ordyn-Nashchokin, Moscow was also ready to recognize him but metropolitan Josephs showed a firm desire to stay under the Jurisdiction of the Constantinople patriarch, to what Moscow government of course couldn’t agree. Moreover, metropolitan forbade his inferiors to mention tsar Oleksiy Mykhaylovych and ordered that “in church at sinaptai everyone prayed for pious and godgiven hetman Petro” [1, p. 66].

Kyiv metropolitan made a great influence on hetman Doroshenko. According to D. Bantysh-Kamensky, the union, Petro Doroshenko signed with Turkey was a result of Joseph Tokalsy’s direct influence [2, p.334-335]. However, as the time will show, these efforts were useless. Moscow forestalled and “beat” Ukraine in foreign policy intentions. In 1681 Crimean Tatars and Moscow tsarism concluded a peace treaty. And in 5 years Moscow government and the government of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth signed taking into account political situation of that time more important treaty(a so-called “Eternal Peace”). These events meant the collapse of P. Doroshenko’s political diplomacy.

Hetman Doroshenko’s unfortunate campaign activated Muscovite effects to tell the truth only in Left-bank Ukraine. Besides, mostly commoners naively believed in a “good” tsar that can protect using his power. Cossack sergeant majors and higher clergy also acceded to Moscow, but tried to save their liberty and autonomous status being a part of it. The letter of the

Left-bank hetman Demyan Mnohohrshny to a bishop Lazarus Baranovych (1668) serves as a proof. It should be mentioned that Lazarus Baranovych at that time was a locum tenens of Kyiv Metropolitanate, the status of which was determined by Moscow. In the letter hetman seemed to discuss the terms of Left-bank Ukraine passing over the supremacy of Moscow. "After consulting with regiments from this bank of Dnipro... - wrote D. Mnogorishny - if the sovereign, has a desire to recognize us, his subjects, with all our former liberties affirmed at Pereyaslav by vapid memorable hetman Khmelnytsky, me and my regiments are apt to bow before your majesty. If your majesty doesn't accept our service, then we're ready to die for our liberties" [14, p.362-365]. Archbishop Lazarus Baranovych supported hetman and in January 1669 sent a special legation. Authorized persons carried decrees resolved by higher secular and ecclesiastical arm that contained 12 paragraphs-demands. "We will knock our forehead before the sovereign so that he saved our former liberties and ordered to write a charter containing this liberties for us - Zaporozhian Cossacks and the whole nation of Malorussia " [1, p.23-24, 26].

However, Moscow government had no desire to make any concessions to Ukraine. In charters, addressed to D. Mnohohrshny, tsar only gave assurance that he won't revenge upon Ukrainian nation and his hetman I. Bryuhovetsky for their "sins" before Moscow government and declared them his favour [3, p. 71]. At the same time he didn't mention a word about returning to Ukraine its former rights and liberties. Moscow seemed to understand that discussions about liberties is useless because the considerable part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth population is positively bows to "mighty sovereign's hand". On these conditions tsarism aims at a complete destruction of any display of Ukrainian authority. The representatives of Right-bank Ukraine higher clergy (the bishop of Perm, Inokentiy Vynnycky and the bishop of Lviv, Joseph Shumlyansky) were the first to sense this threat and that's why activated the process of introduction of union on the territory of their eparchies [19, p.157-158]. For this reason the process of denationalization and annihilation of Ukraine authority enclosed the Left-bank Ukraine. Sources certify that situation of Ukrainian church was the object of relations between Moscow and Poland. Beside the Truce of Andrusovo signed in 1667, resolutions and negotiations in 1672, 1679 and 1680 also concerned religious questions. The researchers are right asserting that "all this prepared the subsoil for the 9th paragraph of "Eternal Peace" signed on April 29th, 1686 " [8, p.267]. The 9th paragraph of the treaty formulated a basis of canonical and legal command that gradually meant the incorporation of Kyiv Metropolitanate into the Moscow patriarchate.

The complete submission of Kyiv Metropolitanate into the Moscow patriarchate happened under the hetmanate of Ivan Samoylovych (1672 - 1687) who fawned upon Moscow tsarism and made everything possible to quicken the process of incorporation. Our next narration will describe his share, forms and methods of realization of this religious and political project developed in Moscow and realized by Ukrainian political and ecclesiastic representatives.

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